Averting group failures in collective-risk social dilemmas by Chen, X. et al.
Averting group failures in 
collective-risk social dilemmas
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A. and Perc, M.
IIASA Interim Report
2012
 
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A. and Perc, M. (2012) Averting group failures in collective-risk social dilemmas. IIASA Interim Report. 
Copyright © 2012 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/10247/ 
Interim Report on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
 International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 342
Fax: +43 2236 71313
E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at
 
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only
limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. 
Interim Report IR-12-028
Averting group failures in collective-risk social dilemmas 
Xiaojie Chen (chenx@iiasa.ac.at) 
Attila Szolnoki 
Matjaž Perc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by 
Ulf Dieckmann 
Director, Evolution and Ecology Program 
February 2015 
 
 
Averting group failures in collective-risk social dilemmas
Xiaojie Chen,1 (a) Attila Szolnoki,2 (b) Matjazˇ Perc3 (c)
1 Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), A-2361 Laxenburg,
Austria
2 Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
3 Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Korosˇka cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
PACS 87.23.Ge – Dynamics of social systems
PACS 89.75.Fb – Structures and organization in complex systems
PACS 89.65.-s – Social and economic systems
Abstract –Free-riding on a joint venture bears the risk of loosing personal endowment as the
group may fail to reach the collective target due to insufficient contributions. A collective-risk
social dilemma emerges, which we here study in the realm of the spatial public goods game with
group-performance-dependent risk levels. Instead of using an overall fixed value, we update the
risk level in each group based on the difference between the actual contributions and the declared
target. A single parameter interpolates between a step-like risk function and virtual irrelevance
of the group’s performance in defining the risk level, thus bridging the two extremes constituting
maximal and minimal feedback. We show that stronger feedback between group performance and
risk level is in general more favorable for the successful evolution of public cooperation, yet only
if the collective target to be reached is moderate. Paradoxically, if the goals are overambitious,
intermediate feedback strengths yield optimal conditions for cooperation. This can be explained
by the propagation of players that employ identical strategies but experience different individual
success while trying to cope with the collective-risk dilemma.
Introduction. – Many of today’s most pressing
global challenges can be described as “problems of the
commons” [1]. Be it the preservation of natural resources
for future generations, the provisioning of health and so-
cial care, or the supply of energy to meet our constantly
increasing demand. All these challenges require that we
abandon some luxury on the personal level for the greater
good. The call goes out to all of us to intensify the level
of public cooperation across human societies [2]. How-
ever, the temptations to free-ride on the efforts of others
are strong, especially since by nature we are hardwired to
maximize our own fitness regardless of the consequences
this has for the public good. Accordingly, the “tragedy
of the commons” [1] looms upon us, although we, the hu-
mans, are known for our highly developed other-regarding
abilities.
The public goods game is traditionally employed to
study problems that arise due to the dissonance between
(a)E-mail: chenx@iiasa.ac.at
(b)E-mail: szolnoki.attila@ttk.mta.hu
(c)E-mail: matjaz.perc@gmail.com
individual and societal interests. During the game, all
players that are members of a given group have to de-
cide simultaneously whether they wish to contribute to
the common pool or not. Regardless of their decision,
each player receives an equal share of the public good after
the initial contributions are multiplied by a synergy factor
that is larger than one. Evidently, individuals are best off
by not contributing anything, while the group is most suc-
cessful if everybody contributes. The competition between
defection and cooperation has received ample attention in
the recent past, and several mechanisms have been iden-
tified that promote prosocial outcomes. Examples include
voluntary participation [3–5], inhomogeneous player activ-
ities [6, 7], social diversity [8–10], appropriate partner se-
lection [11, 12], aspiration-driven mobility [13–17], the in-
troduction of punishment [18–24] and reward [25,26], coor-
dinated investments [27], the Matthew effect [28], complex
interaction networks [29–34], conditional strategies [35],
and nonlinear benefit functions [36–38], to name but a
few examples.
The public goods game in its classical form, however,
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fails to capture some important features of social dilem-
mas that arise frequently in realistic situations. A good
example is the climate change dilemma, where regions or
nations may opt not to reduce their carbon emissions in
order to harvest short-term economic benefits. Yet this is
not the end of the story since failure to meet the emission
targets may have dire consequences in the future. The
so-called collective-risk social dilemma is more appropri-
ate for such a scenario [39]. There all players are consid-
ered to have an initial endowment, and cooperation means
contributing a fraction of it to the common pool. Defec-
tors do not contribute. The risk level is determined by
a collective target that should be reached with individ-
ual investments. If a group fails to reach this target, all
members of the group loose their remaining endowments
with a certain probability. Otherwise, everyone retains its
current endowment. Experimental and theoretical stud-
ies have shown that high risks of collective failures raise
the chances for coordinated actions [39–42], and that this
outcome is robust against variations of the interaction net-
work and the size of the population [43].
In the pioneering works, the probability that endow-
ments will be lost or kept was most frequently considered
to be a step-like function of the gathered collective invest-
ments [39–41,43]. Hence, if the investments did not reach
a certain fixed threshold the probability to loose endow-
ments was independent of the actual contributions. Such
a consideration, however, is not necessarily accurate. It is
intuitively easy to imagine cases where the probability of
a collective failure is much higher if the group members
are far from reaching the collective target, and vice versa
if the target is nearly yet not quite reached. Staying with
the climate change dilemma, it is reasonable to assume
that the escalation of problems is much more likely if the
carbon emissions a far in excess of the allowable quota
than if they are just above it [42].
Given these facts, we here propose that the risk level
ought to decreases continuously with increasing group in-
vestments, and we investigate what are the consequences
of the details of such an upgrade on the evolution of coop-
eration in the public goods game that is staged on a square
lattice. In particular, we introduce a function where a sin-
gle parameter defines the feedback strength between the
actual performance of each group in relation to the de-
clared collective target and the risk level constituting the
probability that investments will be lost. While the larger
the difference between the target and the actual contribu-
tions the higher the probability that all group members
will loose their investments, this dependence can be made
more or less severe depending on the feedback strength.
By varying the later and the value of the collective target,
we find that high targets require an intermediate feedback
strength for public cooperation to thrive, while for mod-
erate targets the higher the feedback strength the better.
Model. – As the interaction network, we consider a
square lattice of size L × L with periodic boundary con-
Fig. 1: Risk function in dependence on the group investment
for different values of the feedback parameter h. For larger h
the traditionally considered step-like outlay is recovered. The
collective target is T = 2.5.
ditions. Each player on site x has an initial endowment
b and is designated as a cooperator (sx = 1) or defector
(sx = 0) with equal probability. Cooperators contribute
an amount c ≤ b to the common pool while defector con-
tribute nothing. Moreover, there is a collective target T
to be reached with the contributions in each group. If in
group Gi the target is reached or surpassed, each member
can keep its remaining endowment. If not, all members
lose their endowments with a probability ri, which is de-
termined by a Fermi-type function
ri =
{
tanh[(T − Si)h] if Si < T,
0 if Si ≥ T,
(1)
where h > 0 is the key parameter controlling the feedback
strength of failing to reach the target T (see Fig. 1), and
Si =
∑
x∈Gi
sx represents the total amount of collected
contributions in group Gi. Accordingly, player x obtains
its payoff P ix from group Gi. Using the von Neumann
neighborhood, each group has size N = 5, and each player
is member in five overlapping groups, thus reaching a total
payoff Px =
∑
iP
i
x.
After playing the game, each player x is allowed to learn
a potentially better strategy from one of its randomly cho-
sen neighbors y in agreement with the probability
f(Py − Px) =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/κ]
, (2)
where κ denotes the amplitude of noise [44]. Without loss
of generality we use κ = 0.5, implying that better perform-
ing player are readily adopted, but it is not impossible to
adopt the strategy of a player performing worse. The evo-
lutionary process is implemented with synchronous updat-
ing, where all players first collect their payoffs and then
alter their strategies simultaneously. To test the robust-
ness of our findings, we have verified that similar results
are obtained by using asynchronous updating.
Presented results were obtained on 100× 100 sized lat-
tices, but remain intact also if a larger system size is used.
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Fig. 2: Average cooperation level in dependence on the dona-
tion ratio c/b. (a) Using h = 0.5 and different values of T . (b)
Using T = 3 and different values of h.
The cooperation level was determined as a key quantity ac-
cording to L−2
∑
xsx(∞), where sx(∞) denotes the strat-
egy of player x in the dynamical equilibrium.
Results. – First, we show in Fig. 2(a) the cooperation
level in dependence on the donation ratio c/b for five dif-
ferent values of T at a fixed intermediate feedback strength
h = 0.5. It can be observed that the cooperation level de-
creases with increasing c/b for all T . For T = 0 our model
behaves similarly to the traditional public goods game in
an unstructured population [37]. In this situation, the co-
operation level is zero for any c/b > 0, while for c/b = 0
it converges to 0.5. When T is sufficiently high, full co-
operation can be observed for sufficiently small donation
ratios. Interestingly however, for T = 5 the performance
is worse than for T = 4; a detail that we will elaborate on
in what follows. Figure 2(b) features qualitatively similar
results, only that the focus is on the impact of h at a fixed
target T = 3. It can be observed that larger feedback
strengths can sustain cooperation at larger c/b, although
the positive effect begins saturating for h > 1.
In order to explore these effects more precisely, we
present the cooperation level in dependence on h and T
together for three representative values of c/b in Fig. 3.
We find that small values of h (weak feedback) result in
full defection for each considered c/b value and regard-
less of T . For intermediate h, the cooperation level in-
creases from zero to one upon increasing T . For large
h (strong feedback), however, the cooperation level first
increases until a certain maximum is reached, but then
starts falling as T increases further. If we compare the
cooperation level at a fixed target value, we find that, in
general, stronger feedbacks (higher h) yield better results.
Yet this is certainly not valid for high target values, where
an intermediate value of h ensures much better conditions
for the evolution of public cooperation.
This unexpected outcome is demonstrated separately in
Fig. 4, where we plot the cooperation level as a function
of T at two different values of h. As the figure shows,
stronger feedback generally results in a higher frequency
of cooperators, but this relation reverses at high values of
T . The difference between final states can be so large that
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 
 
10 10 100 10
1
h
T
(a)
(b)
(c)
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Fig. 3: Contours depicting the cooperation level in dependence
on h and T for three different donation ratios: (a) c/b = 0.05,
(b) c/b = 0.2, and (c) c/b = 0.25.
applying intermediate h yields a full C state, while for
large h the system arrives to a defector dominated state.
To get an understanding of this rather paradoxical be-
havior, we compare the time evolution of strategies at two
representative values of T using the same c/b = 0.2 do-
nation ratio for three different values of h. When plot-
ting the spatial distribution of strategies, it is useful to
use different colors not just for different strategies but
also for the different levels of individual success in terms
of dealing with the collective-risk social dilemma. More
precisely, we distinguish players based on their ability to
collect payoffs from the majority of their groups or not.
Accordingly, a “successful defector” (SD, denoted yellow)
is a defector that can gather payoffs in at least three of
the five groups where it is involved. In the opposite case,
p-3
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Fig. 4: Cooperation level in dependence on the collective target
T for two different values of h, both at c/b = 0.2.
the player is marked as a “failed defector” (FD, denoted
red). Identically, we distinguish between “successful co-
operators” (SC, denoted blue) and “failed cooperators”
(FC, denoted green).
Figure 5 shows the evolution from left to right at
T = 2.6 for h = 0.1 (top row), h = 0.8 (middle row),
and h = 10 (bottom row). When the feedback is weak
(top row) almost every player can collect payoffs from the
majority of the five groups where it is member [SD (yel-
low) and SC (blue) players dominate in Fig. 5(a)]. Since
the collective risk fails to avert from antisocial behavior
defectors can keep their benefit with a high probability
and cooperators therefore have no chance to survive. As
a result, the system terminates into a full D state where
there is a dynamical balance between SD and FD play-
ers. Their spatial distribution is uncorrelated, as shown
in Fig. 5(c), and their density is directly related with the
risk function, defined by Eq. 1. Namely, the density of
FD players is proportional to
i<N/2∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
(1− r0)
irN−i0 . (3)
At larger h, shown in the middle row of Fig. 5, the
impact of a higher collective risk becomes visible. Accord-
ingly, the number of SD players decreases significantly and
they can only survive in the vicinity of cooperators. Be-
cause of notable collective risks they cannot aggregate but
need a spare distribution to survive. The other type of de-
fectors (FD, who failed to gather payoffs in more than two
groups) may form clusters, as can be observed in Figs. 5(e)
and (f), because their state cannot change rapidly. More
precisely, while the transition from SD → FD state may
occur anywhere, even in the bulk of a defector island the
transition from FD → SD or from FD → SC state can
only happen via an imitation process at the interface of
FD domains. This dynamical difference of transitions ex-
(b)(a) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(h)(g) (i)
Fig. 5: Time evolution of sub-strategies as obtained for h = 0.1
(top row), h = 0.8 (middle row), and h = 10 (bottom row), at
c/b = 0.2 and T = 2.6 from left to right. Colors distinguish de-
fectors who are able to gather payoffs in three or more groups
(yellow) or at most in two groups (red). Cooperators are dis-
tinguished likewise and denoted blue if largely successful and
green otherwise. Bottom panels depict the corresponding time
evolutions of fractions of the four considered sub-strategies.
plains why FD players (red) are aggregated while SD
players (yellow) are distributed homogeneously but close
to SC players (blue). It is also worth mentioning that FC
players (green) occur rarely, typically in the sea of failed
defectors where the low density of cooperators cannot war-
rant them to avoid the consequences of notable risk.
If using even larger h values, as in the bottom row of
Fig. 5, the above described mechanisms become even more
pronounced. Successful defectors are still able to utilize
the vicinity of cooperators to avoid the risk-dilemma, and
hence their density remains almost the same if compared
to the smaller h cases. This can be observed best from
the bottom-most plots, which depict the time evolution of
the four sub-strategies [note that the stationary fraction
of SD does not change significantly between (b) and (c)
panels]. The relevant change that lifts the fraction of FC,
and hence the cooperation level, is the shrinkage of FD
(red) islands. It is because the sharper risk probability
makes the invasion of FC cooperators from the interface
of FD islands more vigorous. According to this argument,
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it is generally clear why increasing h (stronger feedback)
enhances the overall cooperation level.
The above described mechanism is valid for almost all
target values. An important exception, however, are very
high values of T , where significantly different conclusion
must be drawn. The unexpected behavior is demonstrated
in Fig. 6 where the same c/b ratio and h values were used
as in Fig. 5, but at T = 4.5. At small h (top row of Fig. 6),
the players are initially unsuccessful almost independently
of their strategies. This is because every group fails to
fulfill the ambitious collective target, which is simply too
high. The success of one or the other strategy is just the
result of stochastic events driven by the ri functions. In
the later stages of the game defectors eventually invade
cooperators because the latter have to bare the additional
costs. Notably, cooperators cannot utilize the advantage
of clustering because of the smoothed ri function and the
high value of T . The final full D state, plotted in Fig. 6(c),
is similar to the one obtained for the smaller T value in
Fig. 5(c). The only difference is the higher density of FD
players, which is due to the higher target and hence the
higher risk probability, which can again be estimated from
Eq. 3.
At the intermediate h value, as demonstrated in the
middle row of Fig. 6, the significant change is that SD
players disappear very soon, which is because the sharper
outlay of the ri function makes it unlikely for such defec-
tors to avoid the consequences of the now higher collec-
tive risk. FD players can spread temporarily because they
avoid paying the cost, but later they fail too, as illustrated
by the black continuous curve in the lowermost middle
panel of Fig. 6. Note that this is a typical pattern that
can be observed in spatial evolutionary games. Because
of the relatively unambiguous ri function, the support, or
lack thereof, of a group is clear. Hence, the islands of co-
operators become victorious. It is because they can always
keep their payoffs while defectors cannot. There are some
failed cooperators remaining, but they are predominantly
restricted to the frontiers of SC domains. They are un-
lucky indeed, since of their vicinity to defectors they have
to share the sad consequences of membership in a poorly
(or at least insufficiently) productive group. Paradoxi-
cally, they are the pioneers who begin invading defective
domains because they still have larger payoffs than defec-
tors. When a neighboring defector becomes cooperator the
mentioned FC player may also transform to the SC state
with a higher payoff. As a result, blue SC domains invade
red FD islands and dominate the whole population. This
invasion process and the special role of FC players is very
similar to that of conditional cooperators in a structured
population, as shown very recently in [35].
Even stronger feedbacks revert the described positive
effect in the opposite direction, as demonstrated in the
bottom row of snapshots in Fig. 6. Here even an aggre-
gation of cooperators is mostly unable to fulfill the strict
condition of reaching the high collective target. Note that
12 cooperators should be accumulated around the focal
(b)(a) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(h)(g) (i)
Fig. 6: Time evolution of sub-strategies as obtained for h =
0.1 (top row), h = 0.8 (middle row), and h = 10 (bottom
row), at c/b = 0.2 and T = 4.5 from left to right. The color
scheme of sub-strategies is the same as in Fig. 5. Bottom panels
depict the corresponding time evolutions of fractions of the four
considered sub-strategies.
player for the latter to avoid the collective risk. Even if
this condition is met, there will be unsuccessful coopera-
tors (FC) at the edges of such domains that will be vulner-
able due to their inability to collect a similarly high payoff
and avoid the looming collective risk. Importantly, if using
such a sharp ri function it is irrelevant how close the group
investment is to the collective target: if the threshold is
not met, the “punishment” will be the same as in a fully
defective group. Consequently, unlike in the intermediate
h case, unsuccessful cooperators cannot invade defectors,
which ultimately results in complete defector dominance,
as depicted in Fig. 6(i).
Summary. – We have studied the collective-risk so-
cial dilemma in a structured population, focusing on the
emergence of public cooperation under the influence of
differently shaped risk functions. Most importantly, we
have considered the risk level to decreases continuously
with increasing group investments, with a single parame-
ter enabling us to interpolate between different feedback
strengths of the difference with regards to the declared col-
lective target. In agreement with previous observations,
we have shown that sharper risk functions, corresponding
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to a stronger feedback, in general promote the evolution
of public cooperation and may thus help to prevent the
tragedy of the commons. Yet we have found this to hold
only if the collective targets are sufficiently moderate. If
the goals in terms of the production of public goods are
too high, intermediate feedback strengths can yield much
higher levels of public cooperation than strong feedbacks.
This goes against preliminary expectations, signaling that
the expectation for most of the group members to con-
tribute maximally to the common pool is a difficult propo-
sition that requires a special approach. It is certainly not
impossible to achieve, but requires a certain degree of le-
nience towards all that are involved. An overall high risk
of collective failure is then certainly not advisable, but
rather one should consider diverse and fine-grained risk
intervals that are able to take into account how far away
the production of any given group is from the declared
target. We have revealed key mechanisms that are respon-
sible for these observations by introducing sub-strategies
that further divide the traditional cooperators and defec-
tors based on their individual success in groups they are in-
volved with, thus complementing previous studies [40, 43]
and hopefully promoting our understanding of the evo-
lution of public cooperation in the collective-risk social
dilemma.
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